The role of Self- and Social Image in Economics (SPS)

Concerns about image have been examined in theoretical and empirical work spanning a range of different literatures in economics, including signaling (Spence 1973), identity (Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2010), norms (Benabou and Tirole 2011, Acemoglu and Jackson 2017), status goods (Veblen 1899, Frank 1985, Leibenstein 1950, Bagwell and Bernheim 1996), conformity (Bernheim 1994), motives for pro-social (Benabou and Tirole 2006, Dana, Weber, and Kuang 2007) and (dis)honest behavior (Gneezy, Kajackaite, and Sobel 2018, Abeler, Nosenzo, and Raymond 2019). In this seminar, we will discuss their empirical relevance by studying evidence from economic laboratory and field experiments. We will ask, whether people prefer to be (or be seen) as fair, honest or prosocial and discuss the role of self- or social image concerns more broadly. For example, we will analyze whether people willfully ignore facts to uphold positive self-image. Finally, we will ask whether image concerns may be exploited to achieve behavioral change, and under which conditions image concerns may restrict the use of classical incentives.